On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Prey

”Being Infringed” as a Normatively Induced Innovation Exploitation Strategy

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Abstract:
Patent trolls (or sharks) are patent holding individuals or (often small) firms who trap R&D intense manufacturers in patent infringement situations in order to receive damage awards for the illegitimate use of their technology. While of great concern to management, their existence and impact for both corporate decision makers and policy makers remains to be fully analyzed from an academic standpoint. In this paper we show why patent sharks can operate profitably, why they are of growing concern, how manufacturers can forearm themselves against them, and which issues policy makers need to address. To do so, we map international indemnification rules with strategic rationales of small patent-holding firms and large manufacturers within a theoretical model. Our central finding is that the courts’ unrealistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by inadvertent infringers is a central condition for sharks to operate profitably.

Keywords: Patent, patent shark, patent troll, damage award, infringement

JEL-Classifications: M00, M11, M21, K00, K11, K33

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1 Introduction

"The operations of patent sharks sometimes compel an inventor to obtain patents for articles which are never meant to be placed on the market. A fellow often gets up a machine, and somebody else comes along, and by getting patents through for certain parts, can give the inventor a great deal of bother and make him pay well, even if the inventor gets control of it " (Thomas Edison, 1898)

“Noblesse oblige”, but property does not; legally speaking, at least, this is the case when it comes to intellectual property. Patent holders are – apart from very rare exceptions – not obliged to engage in the production of goods using their protected technology. They may do whatever they want to with their inventions, and often they will consider it most profitable to sell their technology or license it against a royalty fee to a third party (see Arora et al. 2001; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). The law explicitly supports this form of exploitation, offering various remedies to patent holders whose rights are being infringed – no matter whether the patentee uses its protected technology or not (see Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001; Schankerman and Scotchmer, 2001). In the ideal world envisaged by the forefathers of patent law (see Nordhaus, 1969), these remedies should “do justice” to the patent holder and restore his/her incentives to invent in the first place. They should set incentives for patent holders and other parties to enter sales or licensing negotiations from the outset so that no inventor has to fear any infringer at all.5

The above assumes a “credulous” patent holder who has to fear a deliberate infringer. But what if, conversely, R&D-intensive firms start to fear the existence of patent-holding individuals who have ulterior motives of free-riding on a product’s core invention? As the introductory quotation shows, the

5 It is on this background that one has to understand why even small individual inventors are at times entitled to significant damage awards, and why this can be desired from a social standpoint (this is less clear in the example illustrated in FN 2). An illustrative example is the case of Gaus. vs. Conair (See “Jury blows away Conair with $ 28.5 M infringement award”, Litigation Week, 11 February 2002.) Dr. Gaus received a 28.5 million USS compensation from the Conair corporation for the infringement of his patents on circuits used to protect users of hand-held hair dryers from being electrocuted when the dryers are immersed in water. Conair knew of Dr. Gaus’ rights and willfully infringed them (Note: the actual sum awarded to Dr. Gaus in this case is likely higher than what Conair would have been willing to pay for the technology had they acted legitimately. As will become clearer in Section 2 of this paper, Conair’s willingness to pay for Dr. Gaus’ patent before infringement should have amounted to least a
great Thomas Edison recognized already a hundred years ago that a manufacturer who does not hold the rights to each and every invention embodied in its product may face harassment from such individuals.

What likely nobody could have foreseen then are the even greater concerns of today’s leading R&D multinationals of overlooking these small inventors’ patents and being caught in the trap of inadvertent infringement. Today’s patent “sharks” or “trolls”, however, seem to place their bets on precisely this corporate “negligence” or monitoring deficiency. The relevance this topic has assumed over time is dramatic, being reflected in a series of recent disputes and summarized most impressively in the following management statement by Peter Halkjær, Senior IP Manager, Mobile Phones at Nokia:

“From an IP management perspective, patent sharks currently pose one of the great challenges to our firm”

Undisputedly, sharks create uncertainty for innovators and their activities may lead to damage awards which are a multiple of what the shark’s victim, as legitimate licensee, would have been willing to pay ex-ante. Hence, as we will show in more detail in this article, the shark business entails various economic inefficiencies.

Thus, why do trolls exist at all? How can manufacturers forearm themselves against them? And what are the policy consequences? Despite the richness of prior contributions on economics of patent

third of the awarded damages, however. The example only serves to illustrate why seemingly high remedies awarded to individual inventors may still be economically suitable on second glance).

For example, Luxembourg-based InPro Licensing SARL has sued RIM, the maker of the blackberry handheld device, for infringement. In the suits brought against RIM in 2003 in Germany and the UK, rulings by the German Federal Patent Court and the English High Court, early 2006, declared the disputed patent invalid (www.theregister.co.uk, 01/30/2006, www.reghardware.co.uk, 02/02/2006). While the decision in Germany is not yet final, the rulings confirm the general observation that troll patents are often of low quality. More prominent still is the legal battle between RIM and NTP, which is even threatening to shut down RIM’s operations in the U.S. (www.theregister.co.uk, 01/19/2006). NTP largely fits our definition of a troll, but one can argue about the (non-trivial) value of their technology. A second example is Forgent Networks Inc., which has been suing various large companies for the alleged infringement of a patent (US patent No. 4,689,672) that, Forgent claims, covers parts of the JPEG image compression standard (www.eweek.com, 4/22/2004). By April 2005, Forgent had received more than US$100mio in licensing fees from 35 companies, and is suing 44 companies for infringement (www.theregister.co.uk, 04/25/2005). The patent had been granted in 1987 and had not been used for years, until Forgent started asserting it in 2002.
infringement (for example by Scotchmer and Schankerman, 2001; Crampes and Langinier, 2002; Bessen and Meurer, 2006) and managerial aspects of patent licensing (e.g. Agrawal and Garlappi, 2002; Arora et al. 2001; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006) the literature does not seem to provide conclusive answers to these pressing questions.

As we will show in this paper, the simple yet unsatisfactory answer to the core question of “why patent sharks exist” (from which the other aforementioned questions derive) is: because their activity is not only profitable but also perfectly legal. As we will elaborate upon, the threat modern patent sharks can pose to innovative manufacturing firms strongly depends – among other factors – on the applicable law governing infringement as well as its practice by the courts. Surprisingly from an economic standpoint, damage awards may not only be calculated following different rationales within one jurisdiction, but it lies (to the largest extent) within the discretion of the patent holder (and not the court!) to pick the type of remedy he/she prefers (namely “lost profits,” “infringer’s profits” (unjust enrichment), and “reasonable royalty rates”). The real problem occurs, however, as the courts’ interpretation of these damage awards regulations in some cases renders “being infringed” a more profitable option than legitimate negotiation between the patent holder and the potential infringer in the first place – eventually opening the floodgates for the “troll business”.

In more detail, in this paper we pick up on the “patent shark” phenomenon and examine it from a theoretical perspective, encompassing legal, managerial, and economic aspects. To understand this phenomenon, we take a game-theoretical approach to modeling the behavior of trolls and their victims. Here, we primarily sketch the decisions sharks may expect both their prey and courts to make within a complex technological and legal world, and focus less on the activities of the sharks themselves. This paper is dedicated to analyzing:

a) which (managerial) incentives exist for firms to be infringed, and how legal rules governing damage award calculations affect these incentives,

b) why the economic importance of the phenomenon of being infringed (i.e. acting as a shark) likely increased over time,

c) which actions appear appropriate to be taken by firms that are (potentially) threatened by sharks, as well as
d) which discussions are required from a policy perspective in the light of the current business practice.

In line with the aforementioned questions, the paper’s fourfold thrust is as follows:

a) Small firms, and in particular non-producing firms, have incentives to be infringed as they may be awarded remedies by the courts that are systematically higher than what they could have gotten in licensing agreements with large patent holders before infringement,

b) Increasing complexity of some technology fields, the increasing number of patents worldwide, and the resulting difficulty in monitoring the existing technological state of the art, as well as the increasing firm sizes of large patent holding and manufacturing corporations should – in accordance with observations from the real world – lead to an increase in the importance of the “shark business”,

c) Large patent-holding and manufacturing firms are well-advised to spend extensive resources on ensuring access rights to technological substitutes of their core inventions as well as complementary technological assets, to allocate more money to technology monitoring, and to lobby for legislative changes, and

d) Courts need to reflect upon their interpretation of existing legal regulations and work towards a truly welfare-maximizing patent indemnification rule.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section Two provides the basis for understanding why innovators can create a profitable business from having their patents systematically infringed. We present a synopsis of international patent indemnification regulations and show how they should appear in the strategic rationales for different types of innovating firms. Section Three picks up the issue in a formalized fashion and presents a formal theoretical model of technology choice and patent infringement. Here, we juxtapose outcomes in patent litigation cases according to existing indemnification regulations with alternative outcomes from realistic ex-ante technology sales or licensing negotiations (avoiding infringement). We can show that hiding patent-protected technology to be infringed emerges as a dominant strategy for low-tech capacity-constrained innovators (“trolls”).
Section Four discusses the results from both a managerial and a policy perspective, and Section Five concludes and provides an outlook on future research.

2 Theoretical considerations – institutional frame and managerial rationales

In the present section we will elaborate on the theoretical legal and managerial considerations required to explain the existence of the “troll business” through our model in Section Three. To start out with, we define the term “patent shark” or “patent troll” in more detail. We denote *patent sharks or trolls as individuals or firms that seek to generate profits mainly or exclusively from licensing or selling their (often simplistic) patented technology to a manufacturing firm that, at the point in time when fees are claimed, already infringes on the shark’s patent and is therefore under particular pressure to reach an agreement with the shark.*

In order to illustrate the prerequisites for being infringed becoming a profitable and legitimate strategy (see next section), this section is split into two parts. The first part contains a summary of the necessary legal information regarding international\(^7\) patent indemnification rules in order to understand the damage award threat points that the law sets down for potential infringers. Eventually, as we will show, these threat points affect the choice to become a shark or not. In the second part, we will show where these indemnification rules pop up in strategic decision making. Here, we will distinguish between two distinctly different types of firms, using the capacity to manufacture the technological good under consideration as the differentiating trait. Namely, these are (a) large firms with the capacity to supply the entire market with their technological goods, and (b) small firms lacking production capacity altogether. The stage set in this section will form the basis for the formal analysis in Section Three. Here, we will map the legal regulations and the managerial rationales, showing in particular how the indemnification rules create incentives for being infringed.

\(^7\) In order to show the universal dimension of the problem, we will summarize the relevant jurisdictions of five of the major industrial nations worldwide. Moreover, we include the Netherlands in our survey, since Dutch courts have traditionally played an important role in the cross-border patent litigation jurisdiction.
2.1 Patent infringement indemnification – a brief sketch of existing regulations

There are two types of complementary remedies against patent infringement: injunctive relief and damages. When a court grants injunctive relief, this (typically) means that it orders the infringer to refrain from producing and/or selling the infringing good (see, e.g., Lanjouw and Lerner, 2001, on the managerial implications). As for damages, most jurisdictions provide for at least two and sometimes up to three “standard methods” for indemnification assessment. Namely, these refer to the calculation of (a) lost profits, (b) an ordinary licensing fee (reasonable royalty), and (c) infringers’ profits (unjust enrichment). In the following, we briefly present the biggest “generic” international denominator for each of these damage award rules (for a more detailed elaboration on the international differences see Heath et al., 2005).

a) Lost Profits

Here, the patentee shall be reinstated in a position where he/she would have been but for the infringement, with the restriction that only losses from the patentee’s own production are taken into account, not, e.g., from licensing. Note that this restriction marks an important discrepancy between the economic and the dogmatic (legal) notion of lost profits (see below for more details). The calculation method is accepted by all major jurisdictions (US: 35 USC § 284; Japan: Sec. 102(1) Patent Act; Germany: Sec. 139 Patent Act; UK: Sec. 59 Patents Act; France: Art. L615-1(2) Intellectual Property Code). The leading US case required the patentee to show the following:8

(1) demand for the patented product (as indicated by past sales);
(2) absence of competing and non-infringing products (see below);
(3) ability of the patent owner to actually market the quantity of goods9 for which lost profits are claimed;10 and
(4) the amount of profit that would have been made in the absence of infringement.11

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9 The existing law generally accepts that in the absence of marketing capacity, the patentee cannot claim lost profits due to a lack of causality.
10 A requirement that is also specifically mentioned in Sec. 102(1) Japanese Patent Act and that has been applied in the UK decision Catnik Components v. Hill & Smith [2], English High Court, March 16,
Where competing and non-infringing products are on the market, element (2) above requires a so-called market share analysis and an award based on a pro rata percentage of the infringer’s sales.  

Lost profits cannot be awarded where the infringing products do not qualify as a substitute for the ones of the patentee.

b) Ordinary Licensing Fee

The most common form of claiming damages is the ordinary licensing fee (or “reasonable royalty”) for three reasons. First, it is the form of indemnification where plaintiff and defendant can bilaterally agree on the size of the reward. Second, other than in the case where the plaintiff files for lost profits or infringer’s profits, relatively little effort has to be expended by the right owner to prove his case. Finally, many patent owners do not wish to lay open their internal cost structures (which they would have to when filing for lost profits, but not in the case of an ordinary license fee).

It is standard practice to calculate a reasonable royalty “on the basis of what royalty a willing licensee would have been prepared to pay and a willing licensor to accept.” Two aspects appear particularly noteworthy. Despite its theoretical ex-ante focus on what the patentee and the infringer would have agreed upon before infringement, the rule is interpreted with ex-post knowledge and typically simplified in its application. In the case of an innocent infringer, this means that his hypothetical non-infringing options in the case of complete information (e.g., inventing around) will not be taken into consideration. On the other hand, a deliberate infringer will not be made worse off than an

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14 UK decision Catnic Components v. Hill & Smith, (above footnote 6).
ordinary licensee by this type of indemnification; as a matter of fact, sometimes the deliberate infringement might be more profitable than *ex-ante* licensing: until about 1998, it was standard practice in Japan to use royalty rates calculated by over-the-board industrial averages of royalty rates between Japanese companies for domestic patents. This changed once the word “ordinary” was deleted from the wording of Sec. 102(2) Japanese Patent Act.

c) **Infringers’ Profits (unjust enrichment)**

Some jurisdictions allow the patentee to recover the infringer’s profits as one way of calculating damages. In Japan, this remedy is limited to cases where the patentee has actually used the patent. In the UK, the claim for the infringer’s profits is statute based (Sec. 60 UK Patent Act: “account of profits”), and in Germany based on the legal fiction that in using another’s patent, the infringer undertook a business on behalf of the right owner, who would thus be entitled to obtain all profits made from such business. Both jurisdictions allow fairly generous deductions where the infringer has used his own skill, labor and expenses in the marketing of the infringing products. Granting “infringers’ profits” is formally not allowed in France and the US. However, whether or not the US term “unjust enrichment” reflects a remedy that essentially corresponds to the notion of infringers’ profits remains arguable from a dogmatic standpoint. In concordance with earlier works (see Schankerman and Scotchmer, 2001) and for the purpose of this simplified legal analysis, we subscribe to the view that unjust enrichment is a part of infringers’ profits and we will hence treat the two terms synonymously for the rest of this article.

Table 1 recalls in which of the countries plaintiffs may choose among several calculation methods. Moreover it summarizes the calculation methods and how they are applied in some of the

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15 Casucci (2000:692/702)
16 Such statistical averages were taken from Hatsumei Kyokai (ed.), Jisshi ryôritsu (Use and Compensation) (Tokyo 1980); Hatsumei Kyokai (ed.), Gijutsu torihiki to royalty (Technology Transfer and Royalties) (Tokyo 1992).
17 Osaka District Court, March 27, 1980.
18 E.g., German Imperial Supreme Court, October 22, 1930, RGZ 130, 108.
19 For the UK, Gerber v. Lectra (above footnote 7); for Germany, Düsseldorf District Court, July 25, 1996, 4 O 217/95 – “Winkelprofil III.” However, according to the German Federal Supreme Court, the infringer cannot deduct costs that relate to general management expenses: German Federal Supreme Court, November 2, 2000, GRUR 2001, 329 – “Gemeinkostenanteil.”
major patent jurisdictions. In addition to showing the subtle differences between the countries, however, it also illustrates that the treatment of the different norms – namely lost profits, infringers’ profits, and reasonable royalties – is – whenever applicable – internationally comparable to a large extent. This stresses the global importance of the phenomenon we analyze.

Insert Table 1 about here

2.2 The managerial perspective – innovation exploitation strategies as a function of production capacity and other factors

In order to convey the central thought of our paper clearly we need to describe the situation that we analyze in more detail. In doing so, we are setting the stage for the formal model (Section Three), which will pick up the central characteristics of our scenario.

One central assumption for the rest of the paper is that the technological goods are complex (see Merges and Nelson, 1990); i.o.w. there are various patentable inventions in one product. This assumption is fulfilled rather well (Cohen et al., 2000, Reitzig, 2004) in industries such as software, telecommunication, and consumer electronics – for which our analysis likely shows more relevance than for other industries (like chemicals or textiles). In this situation, the different patentable inventions entering the product are technological complements. For the sake of clarity we assume that one or a few inventions of a product can be considered “core” inventions, which resulted from technologically sophisticated research and are difficult to substitute. The design of a product is centered on them and not on their complements (which may be acquired or created in-house). In line with the aforementioned thoughts we assume that the difficulty of (legally) inventing around a patent decreases with decreasing technological sophistication of the patent (Gallini, 1992). Additionally, we assume that all firms are somewhat constrained (see also below) in their monitoring resources for existing technology. Moreover, we presume that decision makers act rationally to the extent that they have the necessary information at their disposal.

One of the major determinants in the choice of an innovation exploitation strategy is production capacities. To illustrate the importance of this determinant, we pick in the following two stylized extremes along the capacity spectrum and show the different innovation exploitation rationales for these firms in our setting.

2.2.1 Production capacity-unconstrained innovative firms

At one end of this continuum we consider R&D intense and production capacity-unconstrained firms, i.e. firms that enjoy the (theoretical) possibility to fully saturate the market under consideration with goods from their own production. Unless such a firm’s costs of production clearly exceed those of a competitor that is capacity-unconstrained as well\(^\text{21}\), our focal firm will likely pursue a strategy in which it seeks to exploit its innovations by selling self-produced goods (consistent with the fundamentals of the resource based view of the firm). To do so, the firm needs to ensure access to both the core technologies of the product as well as the complementary ones required to produce it. Following Teece’s (1986) logic, to pursue this type of exploitation strategy the firm needs to dedicate extensive resources to the development of the “core” components (that are likely not for sale and for which technological alternatives cannot easily be developed).

The rational management of such a firm will incorporate considerations regarding both passive and active (though possibly inadvertent) patent infringement in its rationale. Depending on the set of applicable legal regulations in a particular case of passive infringement (i.e. the focal firm’s patent is illegitimately used by a third party), the firm’s management may pick the type of remedy that suits the firm best – that is, the one yielding the highest payoff. Moreover, the firm will try to incorporate the chance of actively infringing a third party. Assessing the importance of this eventuality, however, will be far more difficult for the focal firm, at least if the infringement is inadvertent (i.e. the firm has no intent to infringe). This is for two reasons. First, the payable amount to the (infringed) patent holder will depend on this third patent holder’s own innovation exploitation strategy, which is in turn affected by the options the law provides. Second, however, the pure chance for the focal firm to actively

\(^{21}\) Note: strictly speaking it does not have to be only one competitor who is capacity-unconstrained; it could also be a group of individually capacity-constrained competitors operating at (overall) lower costs of production. Transaction costs and economies of scale render this very unlikely, however.
infringe a third party is also determined by the innovation exploitation strategy pursued by the third party as will become clearer in the following.

2.2.2 Production capacity-constrained innovators

At the other end of the capacity continuum we consider patent holders (small firms or individual inventors) who do not possess any capacities of their own to produce technological goods. These firms will differ among each other w.r.t. the technological sophistication of their inventions.

Among production capacity-constrained innovators that are truly innovative (i.e., ones that generate potential core inventions), the two most important types are dedicated R&D firms and high-tech (university) start-ups (see Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006; Mowery et al., 2001). Dedicated R&D firms that engage in repeated sales and licensing negotiations with manufacturers will likely invent high quality components (both core and complementary components) that are of real value to the purchasing or in-licensing firms.\(^ {22}\) Next to these specialized R&D/IP vendors, high-technology (university) start-ups will generate sophisticated R&D of a kind that may become a “core” component of a product, even though they are unlikely to engage in repeated interaction with a manufacturer. Both of the aforementioned firm types seek to sell their intellectual property to firms that do have access to production capacities,\(^ {23}\) and both will consider active and passive patent infringement in their innovation rationales. However, in contrast to the capacity-unconstrained innovators, passive infringement will likely be a greater managerial concern than active infringement. Active infringement plays an insignificant role for IP vendors and high-tech start-ups since neither intends to produce a product by itself. On the other hand, the firms’ profit maximizing rationales require safeguarding their inventions against manufacturers who could – if there were no legal remedies – oust their “innovative suppliers”. Again depending on the set of applicable legal regulations, in a case of passive infringement the specialized IP vendors and the high-tech start-ups will be able to pick the remedy that maximizes their individual profits. As will become clearer during our discussion, the incentives that patent indemnification rules create for these firms do not render being infringed a dominant strategy.

\(^{22}\) An example is the UK-based IP vendor ARM, which sells designs for semiconductors.

\(^{23}\) The biotechnology sector provides a wide series of examples. The business plans of so-called dedicated
Finally, however, there also exist firms holding patents to minor technological solutions that can serve as technological complements to a core invention. These patents may result from the firms’ own (technically unsophisticated) research, or may have been bought (for details see below, 4.3).

Some of them concentrate their “R&D” efforts on particular minor complementary technological components to a core invention held by a manufacturing firm. Oftentimes, the technological subtlety of these firms’ inventions is considered marginal and they could easily be substituted by alternative technological solutions so that licensing negotiations with manufacturers will likely lead to negligible profits for these innovators. Their activities can only be understood when incorporating the passive infringement rationale into their strategy. As a matter of fact, these firms hope to be infringed and do everything they can to keep their patent-protected technology as invisible as possible until it is illegitimately used by a manufacturer. As the following model and discussion will show, these firms can generate enormous profits from betting on being infringed. They are the “sharks” – and it is both the patent law and its interpretation by the courts that forms their basis of existence.

3 Infringement Rules and Market Characteristics – A Model

In order to illustrate the fundamental mechanisms that lead to the existence of the “shark” business we develop a simple microeconomic model. Despite its simplicity it captures most of the parameters describing the managerial perspective delineated in 2.2, particularly technology monitoring efforts, invent around costs, and institutional legal details regarding indemnification calculations. To focus on the main mechanisms of the shark business and to keep the model tractable and transparent, some of the relevant variables (e.g. product complexity) are not explicitly parameterized and some

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24 See Graham (2004) for an elaboration of this rationale. Filing divisional patent applications at the USPTO used to be a reflection of attempts to keep parts of inventions secret under the old US patent law (before 1999).

25 We know of no other theoretical contribution parameterizing all of these variables in order to better understand the mechanisms that drive patent infringement. The paper that comes closest to our approach is by Bessen and Meurer (2006). In their article, the authors include two of the aforementioned parameters as variables in a model of endogenous patent dispute resolution; namely, these are invent-around and technology monitoring. While we share the perceived importance of including these two variables in the theory of patent infringement with Bessen and Meurer (2006), the goals, foci and results of the two papers differ substantially however. This is not at least because the introduction of the damage award calculation details is necessary to understand the profitability of the shark business.
simplifying assumptions are introduced. As the next Section (4) will show, however, the effects of these non-parameterized variables can be discussed verbally.

3.1 Sharks’ rationales and actions

In order to study a fully-fledged “game” between sharks and their prey we would need to model the (strategic) rationales of both players as well as the reaction connectivity of their actions. In the following, we take a short cut in order to concentrate on the core of this paper’s contribution (the systematic effects that render the shark business profitable). We therefore assume that a small capacity-constrained patent holder of a non-sophisticated technology has no options but to either approach a manufacturer before infringement (in order to license out his/her technology), or, conversely, to press the manufacturer for royalties after infringement (i.e. act like a shark). We neglect the possibility that the small firm, before patenting, may have the additional option of picking the technological area where it wants to make its investment; nor do we consider the possibility that the small patent holder may lose its infringement case in court (see Bessen and Meurer, 2006, for an elaboration of this aspect). We assume, however, that the small patent holder can anticipate his/her prey’s actions quite accurately. Being a shark will consequently be his/her dominant strategy if profits from being infringed exceed the profits from offering the technology to a manufacturer before infringement.

3.2 Manufacturers’ rationales and actions

A company M (“manufacturer”) is considering entering a certain market. Producing the respective good requires solving a technical problem, to which technology T is the most obvious, but not the only solution. As part of its new product development process, M puts some effort into checking if T is patented. Depending on the result of this monitoring, its prior beliefs about the likelihood of T being patented, cost factors, and sales expectations, M decides whether to enter the market or not, and if so, with what technology. If T really has been patented by a firm PH (“patent holder”), this firm could

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26 For example, we do not model the uncertainty potential infringers face when assessing whether they actually illegitimately use a third parties’ technology or not once they have discovered it (see Bessen and Meurer, 2006, for an elaboration of this idea). We will critically reflect on the impact of these assumptions during our discussion and in the conclusions.
negotiate a license with M, or it could sue M for infringement if T was used illegitimately. We assume that PH has no production capacity of its own. This setup corresponds to Section 2.2.2 above, with M having a (potentially large) manufacturing capacity and PH having none.

Insert Figure 1 about here

In more detail, the manufacturer’s logic is described by the decision tree depicted in Figure 1 (which the shark can anticipate). From the perspective of the “innocent” manufacturer it is nature that, in Stage 1, decides whether technology T is patented (probability $p_p$) or not. M’s prior belief is that T is patented with probability $p_{pM}$, which will in general be different from $p_p$. In Stage 2, M decides how much effort $x$ (measured in monetary units) to put into checking whether T is patented. In Stage 3, Nature decides if – in the case that T is patented – M finds out about this fact. This discovery takes place with probability $p_{\text{find}}(x) = 1 - e^{-ax}$, where $a$ is a constant parameter. M is aware of this probability. Depending on the outcome of its patent search, M performs Bayesian updating to adapt its beliefs about the patent protection of T, to either 1 (if a patent has been found) or to $p'_{pM}(x) = p_{pM} e^{-ax} / (p_{pM} e^{-ax} + 1 - p_{pM})$ (if no patent has been found). The latter term thus gives the perceived probability of patent protection conditioned on negative results after incurring the search cost $x$.

Stage 4 is only relevant if a patent exists and M has found out about it. In this case, M and the patent holder PH negotiate whether to stipulate a licensing contract and at what fee. In all other cases, no action is taken at this stage. Finally, in Stage 5 M decides whether to enter the market, and with what technology. We assume that M has the option of substituting T with an alternative technology $T_{ia}$. Compared to using T, this invent-around causes additional (fixed) development costs of $c_{ia}$ since, as we assumed, T is the most obvious solution to the problem. Without restriction of generality, we set the development cost of T to zero since we treat this case as our benchmark (no matter whether T is a sophisticated core technology or not, see Section 2). The height of the invent-around costs parameterizes the sophistication of the technology. For simplicity we assume, in case a patent on T has

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27 Note that this seeming exogeneity is unrealistic if we assume that sharks make dedicated investment in certain technological areas; however, also aforementioned, we neglect this complication for a start.
been identified and using $T_{ia}$ instead is considered, that M can verify at a fixed cost (contained in $c_{ia}$), and with certainty, that $T_{ia}$ is not patent protected. While this assumption differs from our modeling of how M checks the patent protection of T, it is a second order effect and neglecting it allows us to keep the model tractable.

We do not model market interaction, but instead simply assume that M sells $Q$ units of the good at a price $P$, with variable cost $c_v$ of production and zero fixed costs (apart from development costs). If infringement occurs, we assume that it is detected with probability $p_{d}$. In order to quantify the expected payoffs, we introduce the following further notation. LF denotes the license fee to be paid by M in case a licensing contract is closed (node A in the decision tree). The damages to be paid by M in case of enjoined infringement (nodes B, E) are denoted by $d$. Finally, $p_{dM}$ is the probability, as perceived by M, that infringement will be discovered. Just as M’s prior belief $p_{pM}$ about the probability of patent protection on T may differ from $p_{p}$, also $p_{dM}$ may differ from the “true” value $p_{d}$. Denoting by $\Pi_0 = Q (P - c_v)$ the gross profit (excluding all costs except variable costs of production) M makes on the market (Stage 6 of the tree), we obtain the following equation for M’s expected net profit $\Pi$, conditioned on the search effort $x$ (see the appendix for more details):

\[
\mathbb{E}[\Pi | x] = p_{pM} (1 - e^{-ax}) \cdot \max\{\Pi_0 - LF, \Pi_0 - d, \Pi_0 - c_{ia}, 0\} \\
+ (1 - p_{pM} (1 - e^{-ax})) \cdot \max\{p'_{pM} (p_{dM} (\Pi_0 - d) + (1 - p_{dM}) \Pi_0) + (1 - p'_{pM})(\Pi_0, 0) \}
- x
\]

From Equation (1), one can calculate M’s optimal search effort $x^*$, given its beliefs. We refrain from rendering this rather complex expression. Still, the formal presentation shows two main aspects. First, M might underestimate the probability of existing patent protection ($p_{pM} < p_{p}$) as well as that of infringement being discovered ($p_{dM} < p_{d}$), leading to a suboptimal (too low) level of monitoring.

A similar, though more general, shape of the function $p(x)$ describing the probability of success of monitoring is used by Crampes and Langinier (2002) who, however, focus on the patent holder’s monitoring effort.

Instead, we could introduce a fully-blown market interaction stage. In this stage, M would either sell as a monopolist to a set of buyers defined by a demand curve or M would compete with one or more other firms. However, what is relevant to our analysis is solely the outcome of the market stage in terms of price $P$ and quantity $Q$, since the patent holder does not appear in the market interaction. Thus, modeling this stage explicitly would only burden our model and distract from the actual issue.

Note that we arrive at this result without even assuming that the shark strategically patents in the technological domain of the manufacturer. The effect may be even stronger if we relax this latter assumption.
Second, and most importantly: the cost of inventing around the patented technology becomes relevant as a threat point in various \textit{ex-ante} licensing negotiation scenarios. As Equation (1) shows, in a real \textit{ex-ante} (i.e. before infringement) licensing negotiation, M will at most be willing to pay $d$ or $c_{ia}$ as a royalty to PH, depending on which of the two figures is smaller. Figure 2 illustrates this consideration showing three different profit curves for M in each of the subfigures 2.a and 2.b.

\textit{Insert Figures 2.a and 2.b about here}

Gross profit $\Pi_0$ as a function of quantity sold, $Q$, is shown as the top line in both subfigures 2.a and 2.b. For illustration purposes, we set the contribution margin $\frac{(P - c_v)}{P}$ to 5%. That is, the curve $\Pi_0$ equals 5% of revenues. Parallel to the top lines in 2.a and 2.b run the curves $\Pi_0 - c_{ia}$, in both figures, which become relevant to M in case it has discovered the patent on T and decides to use the non-infringing technology $T_{ia}$ instead (node C). Finally, M’s profit curves for the case of enjoined infringement ($\Pi_0-d$) are shown for different damage calculation rules: Figure 2a shows the case of “infringer’s profits” ($\Pi_0 - d_{ip}$), in which, by definition, M’s net profit equals zero. Figure 2b, in contrast, depicts the case of a “reasonable royalty” ($\Pi_0 - d_{sr}$), where we assume that the court applies a standard royalty rate of 2% of sales. Despite their general importance as the third possible indemnification (see 2.1), “lost profits” do not require separate treatment in our model and hence no separate illustration, since they refer to the shark’s “own production” (see 2.1), which is set to 0 by definition.

The implications of our model findings are discussed in the following.

4 \hspace{1em} \textbf{Results and Discussion}

We now employ the model developed above to discuss the main questions of our article, namely why patent sharks exist, why the shark business is likely growing, which countermeasures manufacturers can take, and, finally, which policy debates appear relevant. Wherever relevant, we will briefly elaborate on the importance of the findings for particular jurisdictions using our overview presented in Table 1.
4.1 Patent sharks – maximizing profits from suing inadvertent infringers

In the middle branch of our tree (nodes E and F in Figure 1) the potential infringer is not aware of the patent on technology T held by firm 1. If, as we assume, T is the cheapest and most obvious solution to the technical problem at hand, then the likelihood of firm M inadvertently infringing T rather than unconsciously inventing around the patent is high (that is, firm M will likely end up in node E). As we will show, existing patent indemnification remedies induce incentives for the patentee PH to trap manufacturers in such situations (node E) and act as trolls. In more detail we argue that courts’ unwillingness to consider hypothetical invent-around costs as a benchmark for the size of damage awards in tort cases is the key to the success of PH’s strategy.

To better understand this rationale, we need to juxtapose the outcome of realistic ex-ante licensing negotiations between M and PH with the fictitious ex-post treatment of inadvertent infringement cases in court. We commence by linking back to our model and describing profit-maximizing rationales for manufacturers in situations of complete information about patented technology.

In the scenario where M has discovered that technology T is patent protected and M enters into licensing negotiations with the patent holder PH, the outcome of the bargaining process depends on both players’ threat points. For the purpose of our paper, two major scenarios must be distinguished: either that inventing around the patent is a feasible alternative to paying damages/licensing, or that it is not.

When inventing around the patent is more attractive for M than paying the (anticipated) damages \(d\), then M is willing to pay a royalty of at most \(c_{ia}\) to PH, while PH demands a licensing fee that is at least positive. PH can not credibly threaten to leave the negotiation table since in this case, M would enter the market using a non-infringing technology. Hence, depending on the two parties’ respective negotiation power any licensing fee between zero and \(c_{ia}\) is possible, as shown by the shaded areas in Figures 2a and 2b The dashed lines within the shaded areas indicate the Nash bargaining solution, which divides the surplus equally between the players.

For those cases in which inventing around the patent is not an option, outcomes differ between the two indemnification regimes as depicted in Figures 2a and 2b. When a standard royalty rate is applied (Figure 2a), then player PH can credibly threaten to terminate the negotiations, since in this
case M would still enter the market using the infringing technology. Hence, the licensing fee will be equal to the anticipated damages, $d_\sigma$ (the “classical” equilibrium outcome as assumed in most prior literature, see Schankerman and Scotchmer, 2001). In contrast, when damages equal infringers’ profits (Figure 2b), then the threat to stop negotiating is again not credible, since in this case M would not enter the market (yielding a profit of zero for PH). Hence, as in the case above, all outcomes between the two threat points (zero, $\Pi_0$) are possible, depending on the players’ negotiation power.

Interestingly, however, the following insight holds irrespective of the relevant indemnification rule and the distribution of bargaining power between the different players: above a certain threshold quantity of sold goods, M’s profits in the case of successful ex-ante licensing negotiations theoretically exceed his/her (counterfactual) profits in case of conviction of patent infringement. Moreover, this difference increases with M’s output quantity. Also, it will be the more pronounced the lower the cost $c_{ia}$ of inventing around, in other words, the more obvious the troll’s technology.

Sharks can come into existence because the law refuses to accept this fundamental logic as delineated in the last paragraph. In the case of infringement, no matter whether inadvertent (middle branch of our tree) or willful (upper part of the tree), the patentee enjoys the freedom to pick the remedy that maximizes his/her profits. Depending on the jurisdiction of concern (see Table 1) the patentee will be able to claim the full infringers’ profits, which might far exceed the realistic royalty fee. But even if the law “only” offers a reasonable royalty fee as compensation for the infringement, “being infringed” may be far more profitable than entering real licensing negotiations ex-ante. This is due to the problem that courts refuse to assess counterfactual invent-around costs during the trial – leading to a distorted calculation of the “reasonable royalty rate” that may again exceed a realistic ex-ante licensing fee by far. Take the following case as an example and concentrate on the damage award figures (rather than the well-known “submarine” tactics):

In 1990, individual inventor Jerome H. Lemelson appealed at the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division against a earlier judgment according to which Mr. Lemelson had been granted damage awards for the non-willful infringement of his patent on a coupling technology used by Mattel, Inc. in one of the corporation’s toy trucks. Mr. Lemelson tried to prove that Mattel, Inc. had willfully infringed on his patent, and in accordance with US law he sought
to be reimbursed with a triple licensing fee. Mr. Lemelson’s idea of multiple damages at the appellate court was denied; however, the single royalty rate he was granted for the inadvertent (!) infringement by Mattel, Inc. still amounted to 24,780,000 US$. The royalty rate was calculated using the standard remedy calculations for royalty rates as a standard 4.5% industry percentage of all truck toy sales of Mattel, Inc. between 1971 and 1986. From an economic standpoint, this result seems very odd. As a matter of fact, if the aforementioned damage award captured the hypothetical *ex-ante* bargaining process correctly, this would mean that Mattel, Inc. would have had a willingness to pay roughly 25 mio US$ to Mr. Lemelson. Given the status of Lemelson as an individual inventor, his need to access complementary assets to produce a competitive truck toy himself, Mattel Inc.’s likely low costs of developing an alternative coupling mechanism, and the obvious lack of willfulness on the part of the infringer, we leave it to the reader to judge whether he/she is convinced that the actual reimbursement Mr. Lemelson received reflects an economically suitable damage award or whether the result is an outcome of a standard application of a legally accepted, but economically incommensurate, remedy calculation.

Towards the end of this Section, we would like to pick up on two issues which are also nicely illustrated by the aforementioned example.

Often, cases of the aforementioned kind are used as examples to illustrate the value of hiding patented technology (submarines). A closer look, however, reveals that keeping an invention secret is not a sufficient condition for trolls to run a profitable business. Hiding does increase the odds that the potential infringer will overlook the patent, which is a necessary condition for the troll to succeed. However, only the unrealistic treatment of fictitious *ex-ante* licensing negotiations gives value to “hiding technology”. Conditional on the patent not being found by the infringer, this inadequate legal treatment constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition for the troll business to be profitable.

Moreover, at this point we briefly recall that in our model we have abstracted from the fact that a typical “troll patent” usually covers only one technology among many others contained in a complex product. However, as the example also shows, sharks do not need to worry too much about the marginality of their inventions. Lemelson’s invention was only one among many others used in the product, and still led to a royalty rate of 4.5%. Thus, even under more realistic assumptions than we
could model, being a “troll” emerges as the legitimate dominant strategy for small low-tech inventors. This does not mean that it is not problematic, as we will show more clearly in the following.

4.2 Why “being infringed” is a strategy of growing concern

In our eyes, the aforementioned case gives reason to believe that the calculation of standard royalty rates creates incentives for small patentees to be infringed by large firms. Admittedly, the particular setup of the aforementioned case is historical in the sense that it took place before the US patent legislation introduced the compulsory disclosure period of 18 months after filing irrespective of the granting status of the patent. This means that so-called “submarine” patenting strategies are far less relevant these days than they used to be.31 On the other hand, however, the increasing application rates for protected technology32 massively increase the monitoring costs for existing patented technology and it seems fair to assume that the overall risk of neglecting prior art has risen (see Lemley, 2000; Quillen and Webster, 2000 for an elaboration of this argument). Illegitimate but inadvertent use of patented technology is particularly likely if the manufacturer develops a technical component in a complex technological industry where several (patented) inventions enter the final good (see Merges and Nelson, 1990; Ziedonis, 2004), and that particular technical component does not reflect one of the firms’ core R&D products. Sharks’ chances of running a profitable business in these industries are furthermore enhanced by the irreversibility of substituting infringing components by alternative technologies after a certain point. To manage the complexity of firm boundary spanning R&D projects, hardware and software standards have assumed major importance in these technologies. Once certain specifications of a standard are frozen, the substitution of one infringing technology with an easy-to-invent alternative entails the adjustment of such a large number of product components that inventing around (though ex-ante cheap) becomes extremely costly ex-post (see Bekkers et al., 2002).

Our model captures the above considerations. M might underestimate the probability of existing patent protection \( p_{\text{OM}} < p_{\text{g}} \) as well as that of infringement being discovered \( p_{\text{OM}} < p_{\text{d}} \). Both assumptions seem quite realistic given that the activity of patent trolls has increased considerably in

31 Due to continuations of patents filed before the patent reform, however, some risk of trapping into submarine patents in the US may still prevail.
32 See the statistical bulletins of the European and the US Patent Office for impressive evidence.
recent years. Hence, large manufacturers might not yet be accustomed to the number of “troll patents” and the degree of monitoring trolls exert. Since monitoring is one of the troll’s main business activities, and since monitoring a few potential (large) infringers is both feasible and potentially most profitable for the troll, the “true” probability $p_d$ is likely to be close to 1.

Underestimating the above probabilities implies that M chooses too low a value for its monitoring effort $x^*$, as Equation (1) shows. When $p_{pdM}$ becomes smaller, then the benefits of searching for the patent – and thus, if it is found, of being able to maximize profits within the (advantageous) first line of Equation (1) – decrease. When $p_{deM}$ becomes smaller, then the outcome of the second line’s maximization becomes more attractive, again making maximization along the first line’s entries relatively less desirable. In addition, $E[\Pi|x]$ is overestimated (for any given value of $x$, and in particular for $x^*$), potentially leading to market entry decisions which should not have been taken.33

Finally, the creation, in 1982, of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) is generally seen to have strengthened the position of patent applicants and patent holders (e.g., Lerner 1994; Lanjouw 1994; Lanjouw and Schankerman 1997; Kortum and Lerner 1999). This fact is illustrated by a CAFC decision in 2002, which basically dismissed obviousness as an argument for rejecting a patent application (Harhoff and Hall 2004). The authors quote deputy commissioner Esther Kepplinger saying this ruling means that “we can’t reject something just because it’s stupid.”34 Given the focus of patent trolls on technically simple technologies, this ruling further simplifies their activity.

4.3 Potential counteractions by manufacturers

From the above discussion it appears intuitive that manufacturing firms are well-advised to prepare for shark attacks. Understanding the strategies that sharks pursue is key to designing effective counteractions.

One of the approaches that manufacturers can pursue is to increase their monitoring efforts. Being faced with a potentially increasing “infringement” business, the allocation of resources to this activity may require a timely revision. “Freedom to operate” reports need to become an even more crucial

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33 More details are provided in the appendix. We do not examine the effects of uncertainty associated with the outcome of court cases and assume that patent holders will always win. Including the possibility that courts may “mistakenly” rule in favor of the infringer (see Bessen and Meurer, 2006) would likely lead to downward corrections of optimal values for $x$. 

- 21 -
element in functional IP management, eventually co-determining the choice of a firms’ entire technological trajectory.

But monitoring will always be imperfect, even if data base research is buttressed by exploiting social networks (see Singh, 2005; Sorenson et al., 2005) especially if the “creativity” of sharks increases. Take the following as an indication: with dedicated investment funds today starting to buy patent portfolios of bankrupt estates with the intent to pressurize potential infringers it will be ever harder for a manufacturer to foresee where the dangers eventually lurk.35

For these reasons R&D intense manufacturers are well-advised to create independence from particular technological solutions. Designing technological standards and products in such a fashion that non-core elements can be substituted by a range of alternatives appears more important than ever before. Building technological solutions based on open-source standards will further reduce the likelihood of ending up in inadvertent infringement, for two reasons. First, not only the focal firm, but also other parties have an interest in searching for potentially infringed patents. Second, disclosing a development as open source immediately turns it into prior art, such that (at least in principle) no patents on the inventions contained in the development can be granted anymore.

Finally, however, large innovators may exploit one of their comparative advantages; namely, using their market power to lobby for regulations which put an end to the business of “being infringed”.36 This option may be a very feasible one, since, as the following Section 4.4 will show, there are various objectively good arguments to support such an initiative.

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34 Source: David Streitfeld, “Note: This Headline is Patented” (L.A. TIMES, 02/07/2003). To understand this logic consider the following: in complex technologies (Merges and Nelson 1990) large R&D intense manufacturers often enter multilateral cross-licensing agreements with other players (see Hall and Ziedonis, 2001 for a study in the semiconductor industry). In the case of inadvertent infringement by either one of the parties, disputes will often be resolved backstage; hence, “overlooking” another player’s IP is far less dangerous than that of a shark. If, however, a player goes bankrupt and sharks manage to buy this ex-player’s portfolio out of the bankruptcy estate, the ex-player’s initially harmless patents become a real danger for the remaining manufacturer.

For example, Microsoft and other large corporations are lobbying legislation for a patent reform which was introduced in the House of Representatives in June 2005. Among other things, it proposes to “limit a patentee’s access to injunctions by requiring a likelihood of irreparable harm” (Steptoe and Johnson LLP, 2005, www.steptoe.com/publications/PI10264.pdf). While not obviating the troll business altogether, this proposal would weaken their position considerably. Also, a post-grant review in the style of the opposition procedure at the European Patent Office is favored by the lobbyists (news.zdnet.com, 09/13/2005).

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4.4 The policy side – considerations for an optimal infringement rule

Whereas “being infringed” is an interesting and profitable strategy for small innovators, it poses great problems to large R&D intense manufactures, and potentially to society. From a policy perspective, an optimal patent indemnification rule should maximize welfare that is generated for all parties, including sharks, R&D intense manufacturers, and consumers. Designing such an optimal indemnification rule would blow the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, we would like to introduce some basic considerations that will shed light on some of the deficiencies of the current regulations.

The economic purpose of the patent system is to provide incentives for innovation by allowing the patentee to control the use of the patented technology for a limited period of time. The social gains derived from these incentives and the patent system’s disclosure function are weighed against the inefficiencies resulting from market power, the cost of the patent system, and the restrictions imposed on subsequent innovators. The question of how to strike the optimal balance – in particular the issue of patent length and patent breadth – is complex even in a world without patent infringement.

The trade-off, however, does become even more difficult in a world where infringement can take place. If we take the – plausible – short cut that the patent granting system should define how much an innovator is rewarded for his/her invention, then allowing (not persecuting) infringement cannot be considered socially beneficial since it would distort optimally chosen innovation incentives due to the patentee’s shaken trust in the system. Thus, if some kind of ‘infringement’ (use of the patented technology by others than the holder) was deemed overall beneficial by policy makers, then it should make sense to define the underlying patent more narrowly in the first place (thus defining an otherwise infringing act as a legitimate one). Following this rationale, we can subscribe to the view that damages should at least cover the losses the innovator incurred due to infringement. That is, he/she should be put into a position “but for” the infringement.

The question then is what the patentee’s damages amount to? Here, we need to distinguish two major scenarios. When joint profits of patent holder and infringer are *decreased* by the infringer’s use of the technology, then the patentee’s “lost profits” are unambiguously defined as the difference between its profits *without* and *with* the use of the technology by the infringer.

However, when their joint profits are *increased* through the infringement – as is the case, e.g., for research tools (Schankerman and Scotchmer 2001) as well as in our model – then the situation is less clear-cut, and we have to consider two further sub cases.

First, consider the case of full information and non-substitutable technologies (sub case 1). Absent infringement, the two parties would have negotiated a licensing contract. As to the licensing fee, we lean on the rationale put forth by Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) arguing that the outcome of *ex-ante* licensing negotiations will depend on what the law promised the patentee as a remedy in the case of infringement. Since the latter refers to the outcome of hypothetical *ex-ante* licensing negotiations, the *ex-post* remedy and the *ex-ante* licensing fee will be self-enforcing. Infringement should not take place in equilibrium (see the upper branch of our tree). Quite obviously, from a real-world perspective this theoretical view is unsatisfactory, if only for the fact that it cannot explain infringement as anything but an “out-of-equilibrium” event.

The situation differs when incomplete information and substitutive technologies are introduced (sub case 2). With incomplete information, inadvertent infringement does take place in equilibrium (node E in the tree). At the same time, it implies that the assessment of hypothetical *ex-ante* licensing negotiations by courts becomes much more difficult, since an inadvertent infringer did not even have the chance to enter such negotiations. Had he/she done so, he/she would have considered the option to use a substitutive technology instead. As we have argued above, neglecting this option of inventing around the patented technology can lead to highly exaggerated estimates of hypothetical *ex-ante* licensing fees.

The fact that these latter cases of inadvertent infringement are not treated realistically by the courts may explain why we observe significant numbers of patent infringement cases, even though classical theory (sub case 1) cannot explain them. In our eyes, there is therefore a pressing need for a theoretical elaboration of the economics of patent infringement. While the details of this research must
be left to future studies, we do, with all due modesty, strongly encourage legal policy makers to consider these downsides of current indemnification practice, especially in light of the rising risk of unconscious infringement. Introducing hypothetical invent around costs as an element in the equation to calculate damages in inadvertent infringement cases strikes us as necessary. We recommend such a reconsideration despite the notorious difficulties that courts face when assessing counterfactual situations (like hypothetical invent around scenarios). Quite clearly, however, the consideration of this additional parameter must not relieve manufacturers of their responsibility to keep monitoring prior art technology altogether. Trading off these parameters to design an optimal infringement rule will be a challenging task.

5 Conclusions and Outlook on Future Research

Motivated by the vast gap between the managerial relevance of patent trolls on the one hand and the theoretical understanding of the profitability of their business on the other, this paper sought to answer four different questions; namely, why sharks exist, why their importance has increased, what countermeasures manufacturers can take, and what policy debates should be held. We addressed these questions by mapping international legal indemnification rules for patent infringement with managerial rationales of capacity-constrained holders of (simplistic) patents who – by assumption – have two choices: they may enter licensing deals about their technologies with potentially interested manufacturers shortly after discovery/patenting, or they may wait to be infringed (i.e. act like a shark). By doing so, we were able to show that a necessary and, conditional on the patent not being found by the potential infringer, sufficient condition for these firms to act most profitably as sharks is the inadequate (unrealistic) treatment of hypothetical ex-ante (i.e. before patent infringement) licensing negotiations between the patent holder and infringer in courts. In other words: under current indemnification regulations, “being infringed” is the dominant innovation exploitation strategy for small, capacity-constrained firms owning trivial patents. This central finding seems to hold across all the jurisdictions we studied, although it is particularly relevant in countries such as Germany where infringers’ profits are awarded as one potential remedy. However, as we also demonstrated, even in countries where reasonable royalties are the only possible indemnification for a shark, the mistakenly
high benchmark using standard industry rates overcompensates the troll and renders being infringed valuable. 39

We further argued that the increasing technology monitoring efforts for victims of trolls, namely large manufacturing R&D intense firms, due to ballooning numbers of patent applications, likely led to the increase of sharks’ relevance for innovators. It facilitates ‘trapping’ manufacturers by ‘hiding’ patented technologies in confusing patent thickets – a second necessary condition for sharks to operate. Moreover, the strengthening of patent holder’s rights in certain jurisdictions (e.g. the US) likely enabled sharks to operate more profitably, too. We illustrated that R&D intense manufacturers are well-advised to revisit their budget allocations for technology monitoring efforts and to patent alternatives to their core inventions (in complex industries), and that concerted lobbying efforts to change patent indemnification laws may be promising; especially since, as we showed, sharks potentially dissipate social value by reducing manufacturers’ incentives to innovate. And since they do so, sharks are a matter of concern for policy makers who – in our eyes – urgently need to revisit the practice – rather than the law itself – of patent indemnification. In more detail, we suggest that inadvertent infringers’ trade-offs before infringement be more realistically captured by courts than is currently the case. The dangers associated with the malassessment of counterfactuals (like the manufacturer’s invent around option ex-ante) – a classical argument potentially to be brought forth against our conclusion – does, in our eyes, not vindicate the simplistic current practice by the courts that strengthens the trolls’ positions.

As is common in research, this paper left us with as many questions as it did answers. Some of the questions strike us as relevant avenues for further research.

One trajectory of research is theoretical and of concern for theoretical scholars in the areas of law and economics. In Section 4.4 we showed that the current theory on patent infringement stops

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39 It strikes us as extremely counterintuitive to base the royalty rate calculation in the case of inadvertent infringement on the average percentage of standard industry contracts. The latter are outcomes of real licensing negotiations, while an inadvertently infringed patent has never been subject to such negotiations. Most likely, a problematic selection separates the different cases, however. A patent holder who anticipates the outcome of ex-ante licensing negotiations to lie below the average industry royalty rate has an incentive to avoid such negotiations; instead he/she will aim at being awarded damages ex-post and act as a troll. This incentive is larger the higher the damage awards are, and should be particularly pronounced whenever “infringer’s profits” can be awarded (see Figure 2b). In contrast, a patentee holding rights to a technically sophisticated core technology will often not be satisfied when awarded a standard royalty rate ex-post, such that for those patent holders “being infringed” becomes less attractive than negotiating ex-ante.
short of explaining the large number of infringement cases. According to Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001), patent infringement does not take place in equilibrium. While we acknowledge their circular logic of self-enforcing royalty rates and damage awards in the case of complete information about prior technology, we also showed that inadvertent infringement follows a different logic. Elaborating on this line of thought may refine our theoretical understanding of patent infringement (see also Bessen and Meurer, 2006) and may help to suggest a differentiated optimal indemnification rule.

A second trajectory of further research is empirical by nature. Here, various questions appear intriguing to us, of which we briefly mention the two most interesting ones.

As Table 1 of this article shows, national idiosyncrasies in the jurisdiction of patent indemnification exist. If our model assumptions are correct and of relevance, then we would expect that shark strategies as well as their profitability differ from country to country. “Infringers’ profits” in Germany may represent better bait than reasonable royalties in, say, France. Despite the theoretical possibility of sharks suing multinationals in various countries of jurisdiction, we would expect to see a concentration on certain national markets where, among other things, patent indemnification rules and practice would create incentives for initiating a troll business.

Finally, we deem it an extremely interesting question to inquire empirically into the increasing professionalism of the trolls. R&D manufacturers are observing with growing concern how parts of patent portfolios are strategically bought out by dedicated investment funds, for example during bankruptcy proceedings. According to our information, there have been cases where several patents, originally ‘harmless’ for all manufacturers since they had been used in multilateral cross-licensing negotiations between the different players prior to one of them filing Chapter 13, had become dangerous all of a sudden when they fell into the hands of the non-manufacturing investment fund. While the details of these particular cases are not public, various other indications of an increase in shark professionalism have been discussed in the popular media. One of the firms receiving ambivalent criticism is Nathan Myhrvold’s “Intellectual Ventures”. Specializing in the exploitation of inventions without engaging in production themselves, Intellectual Ventures both performs internal research and buys third parties’ patents in industries that are of relevance to them. These latter activities, officially dedicated to forearming clients of Intellectual Ventures (namely R&D intense
manufacturers!) against potential sharks, have been criticized as troll-like activities by the firm itself.\textsuperscript{40}

No matter which standpoint one takes, the rising complexity of the patent acquisition and sales business and the engagement of non-producers provide a whole new dimension to the problem of cross-licensing, whose empirical relevance is, in our view, important to study.

References


\textsuperscript{40} See Newsweek electronic edition, 22 November 2005 (accessible at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6478691/site/newsweek/).


### Tables and Illustrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lost Profits</th>
<th>Licensing Fee</th>
<th>Infringer’s profits</th>
<th>Choice for plaintiff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 USC § 284. Requirements: (1) demand; (2) marketing capacity; (3) absence of competition, non-infringing substitutes.</td>
<td>Fall-back provision where lost profits cannot be or are not claimed.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 102(1) Patent Act: Multiplication of infringer’s turnover with profits the patentee would have made for such a number of products. Marketing capacity of patentee must be proven.</td>
<td>Sec. 102(3) Patent Act: fall-back provision; estimate of royalty rate.</td>
<td>Sec. 102(2) Patent Act. Not applicable where patent was not used by patentee.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. 249 Civil Code: restitution of the status quo ante. Limitation by production capacity and proof that infringing product could act as a substitute.</td>
<td>Most common form of calculation, normally agreed upon in court settlement. No “infringer’s surcharge” can be claimed except for copyright matter (double royalty).</td>
<td>Based on the legal fiction that infringer undertakes a business allocated to the patentee. Deduction of infringer’s expenses. Infringer’s marketing efforts taken into account.</td>
<td>Yes: claim for inspection of infringer’s accounts allowed prior to choice of calculation base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, likelihood of having made the infringer’s sales, deduction of infringer’s efforts to commercialize.</td>
<td>Yes, a notional royalty as the minimum of lost profits.</td>
<td>Yes, but rarely requested.</td>
<td>Yes, after review of the defendant’s commercial documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only if patent is used, calculated by amount of counterfeit products, loss of turnover (determined inter alia by the quality of the patent) and amount of lost profits. Market share of patentee considered.</td>
<td>Where the invention is not used. Infringer’s turnover multiplied by an appropriate royalty rate.</td>
<td>No, clarified in Patent Act 1968.</td>
<td>If patent is actually used: Yes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Indemnification regulations within and across countries – an international comparison
Figure 1: Excerpt of the “game” between shark and manufacturer. The tree shows the decision-making rationale of the manufacturer. Dashed lines indicate information sets.
Figure 2: Payoffs of M as a function of output quantities, for different scenarios (excluding monitoring cost $x$).

Shaded areas and broken lines indicate possible outcomes of *ex-ante* licensing negotiations.
Appendix

In the following, we elaborate on the derivation and analysis of Equation (1), which has the following shape:

\[
E[\Pi \mid x] = p_{pm}(1 - e^{-ax}) \cdot \max\{\Pi_0 - LF, \Pi_0 - d, \Pi_0 - c_{ia}, 0\} \\
+ (1 - p_{pm}(1 - e^{-ax})) \cdot \max\{p'_{pm}(p_{dm}(\Pi_0 - d) + (1 - p_{dm})\Pi_0) + (1 - p'_{pm})\Pi_0, 0\} \\
- x
\]

Given M’s prior belief that a patent exists with probability \( p_{pm} \) and that, conditional on the patent’s existence, M will discover it with probability \((1 - e^{-ax})\), the term \( p_{pm}(1 - e^{-ax}) \) denotes the overall probability (as perceived by M before searching) of M finding a patent on T if it expends the search effort \( x \). Having found a patent, M maximizes its profits according to the first line of Equation (1).

Correspondingly, the term \((1 - p_{pm}(1 - e^{-ax}))\) in the second line describes the probability (as perceived by M before searching) that M will not find a patent on T, given its effort \( x \). Conditional on not having found a patent, M updates its belief about the probability that a patent nonetheless exists, following the rules of Bayesian updating, to

\[
p'_{pm}(x) = \frac{p_{pm}e^{-ax}}{p_{pm}e^{-ax} + 1 - p_{pm}}.
\]

If no patent exists (probability \((1 - p'_{pm})\)), then the expected payoff from entering the market simply amounts to \( \Pi_0 \). If a patent exists, then the expected payoff is given by \((p_{dm}(\Pi_0 - d) + (1 - p_{dm})\Pi_0)\), with \( p_{dm} \) denoting the probability, as perceived by M, that its illegitimate use of the patented technology will be discovered and infringement will be enjoined. The second line of Equation (1) can be simplified, yielding

\[
E[\Pi \mid x] = p_{pm}(1 - e^{-ax}) \cdot \max\{\Pi_0 - LF, \Pi_0 - d, \Pi_0 - c_{ia}, 0\} \\
+ (1 - p_{pm}(1 - e^{-ax})) \cdot \max\{\Pi_0 - p'_{pm}p_{dm}d, 0\} \\
- x
\]

(I')
From this equation one can calculate M’s optimal search effort \( x^* \) by differentiating with respect to \( x \), setting the result to zero, and solving for \( x \). In doing so, one has to distinguish between the cases that maximization in the second line of Equation (1’) yields either 0 or \( \Pi_0 - p'_{pM} p_{dl} d \). In case the maximization yields 0, we obtain

\[
\frac{d}{dx}E[\Pi | x] = ap_{pM}e^{-ax} \cdot \max\{ \Pi_0 - LF, \Pi_0 - d, \Pi_0 - c_{ia}, 0 \} - 1.
\]

Setting this expression to zero and solving for \( x \) yields \( x^* \) (the equation holds in the range where \( \Pi_0 - p'_{pM} p_{dl} d < 0 \)):

\[
x^* = a^{-1} \ln\left( ap_{pM} \max\{ \Pi_0 - LF, \Pi_0 - d, \Pi_0 - c_{ia}, 0 \} \right).
\]

It becomes immediately clear that a too low prior belief about \( p_{pM} \) on the part of M implies a too low search effort. The case \( \Pi_0 - p'_{pM} p_{dl} d > 0 \) is more complex. Using the abbreviation

\[
B = \max\{ \Pi_0 - LF, \Pi_0 - d, \Pi_0 - c_{ia}, 0 \},
\]

we obtain the following equation for the derivative of \( E[\Pi | x] \):

\[
\frac{d}{dx}E[\Pi | x] = ap_{pM}e^{-ax}\left( B - \Pi_0 + p'_{pM} p_{dl} d \right) + \left( 1 - p_{pM} \left( 1 - e^{-ax} \right) \right) p_{dl} d \frac{dp'_{pM}}{dx} - 1
\]

\[
= ap_{pM}e^{-ax}\left( B - \Pi_0 + p_{dl} d \frac{p_{pM}e^{-ax}}{1 - p_{pM}(1 - e^{-ax})} \right) + ap_{pM} p_{dl} d e^{-ax} \frac{1 - p_{pM}}{1 - p_{pM}(1 - e^{-ax})} - 1.
\]

Setting this term to zero and multiplying by \( 1 - p_{pM}(1 - e^{-ax}) \) yields a quadratic polynomial in \( e^{ax} \). Solving for \( e^{ax} \), taking the logarithm, and dividing by \( -a \) yields \( x^* \). However, the resulting equation is rather involved, and actually more difficult to interpret than the original Equation (1). We thus refrain from displaying the full expression for \( x^* \), instead providing in the main text a discussion of Equation (1).